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Summary findings
Spurring growth in the developing world is one stated  A government that cannot put effective development
objective of foreign aid. Another, more commonly cited,  policies in place is unlikely to oversee the effective use of
objective is reducing poverty. Generally poverty  foreign aid.
reduction and growth go hand in hand, but could aid  On the other hand, there is a relationship  between aid
mitigate poverty without measurably affecting growth?  and a change in infant mortality when the recipient
Burnside and Dollar examine how foreign aid affects  country has relatively good management. When
infant mortality - an important  social indicator that  management is good, additional aid worth  1 percent  of
provides indirect evidence that the benefits of  GDP has a powerful effect, reducing infant mortality by
development are reaching people everywhere.  0.9 percent.
They conclude that in developing countries with weak  In other words, aid spurs growth and improvements in
economic management - evidenced by poor property  social indicators only in a good policy environment.
rights, high levels of corruption,  closed trade regimes,  These findings strengthen the case for targeting foreign
and macroeconomic instability - there is no relationship  aid to countries that have improved their economic
between aid and the change in infant mortality. In  policy. But after controlling for per capita income and
distorted environments, development projects promoted  population,  there has been almost no relationship
by donors tend to fail.  between countries'  economic policies and the amount of
And aid resources are typically fungible, so the aid  aid they get. The relatively indiscriminate allocation of
does not in fact finance these projects. Aid finances the  assistance is one factor undermining the potential impact
whole public sector at the margin, which is why the  of aid.
quality of management is the key to effective assistance.
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Foreign aid has a strong positive e:ffect  on growth in low-income countries with
good policies; it has no measurable effect in countries with severely distorted policy
regimes: that was the main finding of our first paper [Burnside and Dollar (1997)].  While
that result was consistent with other econometric and case study work on aid,' it left open
a number of important questions.  Spurring growth in the developing world is one stated
objective of foreign aid; but the most commonly cited objective is poverty reduction.  In
general, poverty reduction and growth go hand-in-hand, but it is still possible that foreign
aid has been successful at mitigating poverty but not had much measurable effect on
growth.
The primary purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of foreign aid on infant
mortality, an issue of interest for two reasons.  First, infant mortality is an important social
indicator in its own right.  Second, changes in infant mortality provide indirect evidence
about whether the benefits of developmernt  are reaching the broad mass of the population.
We begin in the next section by briefly summarizing  the main results of our study of aid
and growth.  In doing this, we provide an intuitive view of the model that underpinned our
work on growth.  Furthermore, we broaden our indicator of "good policy" to include
more micro or institutional dimensions. In the third section of the paper we turn to the
issue of aid and infant mortality. We develop a simple model and estimate it with the same
panel data used in our growth paper.  To address the likely endogeneity of aid we
instrument for it in a 2SLS procedure.
2The main findings are consistent with our earlier results.  In a poor incentive
environment,  there is no measurable effect of aid on the decline in infant mortality. Thus,
there is no basis from this additional work to change our recommendation that aid be more
sharply targeted to low-income countries that have put good policies into place.
Furthermore, there is some evidence that in a good policy environment aid has an
immediate and direct impact on infant mortality, though the results are not as strong
statistically as the results for growth.
2.  Aid, Growth, and the Incentive Regime
Our basic finding on aid, policies, and growth can be summarized in two simple
figures.  There is very little relationship between the amount of aid that countries receive
and their growth rates (Figure 1).2  This figure relates four-year average growth rates to
the amount of aid received during that period, relative to real PPP GDP.  Boone (1994)
has shown that, if other variables are added to the analysis and aid treated as an
endogenous variable, this non-relationship remains. The picture changes, however, if one
distinguishes  among countries based on their economic policies.  In our earlier work we
developed an index of monetary, fiscal, and trade policies and used this to distinguish
among good policy observations. For good policy observations, those with large amounts
of aid have grown much faster (3.7% per annum per capita on average) than those with
small amounts of aid (2.2%) (Figure 2).3 For countries with poor policy, on the other
hand, it is not the case that those with more aid have grown faster than those with small
amounts.
3Figure 1. Aid and Growth in a Panel of Developing
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Low  AidIn our earlier paper we also develcped a formal growth model to show why it
makes sense that the incentive regime would affect the impact of foreign aid. The main
features of the model were as follows:
*  savings and accumulation respond to the return to capital (which can be
thought of as a broad aggregate of physical and human capital);
*  there are diminishing  marginal returns to capital (a neoclassical production
function);
*  various distortions such as high taxation, inflation, or corruption reduce the
return to capital and hence the incentive to save and invest;
- even with a high return to capital, poor countries have difficulty saving
because of subsistence needs; and
- imperfections in international capital markets limit the flow of private finance
to low-income countries.
This model corresponds closely to a number of observed features of developing
countries.  First, there is very clear evidence that distortions and the incentive regime
affect the growth rates of developing countries.  Some of the important distortions that
have been identified in the literature on growth are closed trade regimes (Dollar, 1992;
Sachs and Warner, 1995); high inflation (Fischer, 1993); and large fiscal deficits (Easterly
and Rebelo, 1993).  In our first paper we formed an index of these three policies.
However, it is also the case that growth i.s  affected by institutional issues such as poor
protection of property rights or high levels of corruption (Knack and Keefer, 1995).  In
4our data set countries with good macroeconomic policies and good institutions have
grown much faster than those with poor policies and weak institutions (Figure 3).4
For this paper we compiled an index of economic management including both the
macro policies and the institutional dimension:
Management = -1.8 + .65 x ICRGE + 5.4 x Fiscal - 1.4 x Inflation + 2.1 x Open
where ICRGE is a measure of strength of property rights, absence of corruption, and
quality of the bureaucracy; Open is the Sachs-Warner measure of trade openness; Inflation
is the rate of increase of the price level; and Fiscal is the budget surplus relative to GDP. 5
In our panel of 56 developing countries, there is a strong correlation of per capita
growth with this index of the incentive regime (Figure 4).  (We have averaged the data
over four-year periods, beginning with 1970-73 and ending with 1990-93.) Botswana or
Thailand would be examples of very good incentive regimes. Indonesia fares pretty well,
though its weak legal system and high level of corruption result in it scoring less well than
Botswana, for example. Poor policy examples are Tanzania or Zambia (all identified in
Figure 4).  The difference in policy between Indonesia (1982-85) and Tanzania in the same
period should have been "worth" about 3 percentage points of growth.
Because the information has been organized into a panel, countries can shift over
time.  Bolivia and Ghana are examples of countries that had very poor policy in the early
1980s, and then reformed to become good policy countries in the 1990s. The macro
policies included in this index are all ones that can be changed quickly if a society and
government want to reform, and there are many examples of large policy improvements
between the 1980s and 1990s. This is one of the encouraging findings of the new growth
5Figure  3. Institutions,  Policies  and Growth
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Economic Management Indexliterature, that measures that are feasible for most countries have a significant  impact on
their growth rates.  At the same time the more institutional aspects of good management --
such as rule of law -- take longer to improve.
This index of the incentive regime can be used to illustrate the main features of our
growth model.  We used the index to divide the panel into a "good policy" half and a
"'poor policy" half.  (Since it is a panel Ghana, for example, can be in the poor policy
group in one period and in the good policy group in a later period.) Figure 5 displays the
relationship between income level at the beginning of a period and subsequent growth, for
the two groups separately. (These are siimply  estimates of a non-linear relationship
between growth rates and initial income.;) For the good policy group, middle-income
countries grow faster than higher income ones (a key finding of the Sachs-Warner, 1995,
study).  The real superstars -- the East Asian tigers or Chile -- are found in this good-
policy, middle-income  group.  These countries have a high return to capital and are
attracting a lot of direct foreign investment. They are gradually catching up with the
developed world.  As they converge on the industrial countries, their growth tends to slow
down.  In our model that results from diminishing  returns to capital.
The poor policy group grows slowly at all income levels -- these countries are
falling further and further behind the advanced ones. It is interesting to note that the
countries that have cut themselves off from globalization -- through restrictive trade
practices and unstable macro policies -- are the ones that are losing out.  From the point of
view of the study of aid, what is particularly interesting is the steep upward-sloping part of
the curve for the good policy group.  Wlhen  low-income countries such as Mali put good
6Figure 5. Growth Rate and Income Level
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GDP Per Capitapolicies into place, they perform better but they do not get the spectacular results of the
middle-income  countries.  There are a variety of explanations for this, which are not
mutually exclusive. These low-income countries may have other characteristics that retard
growth -- being landlocked, for example. Even after controlling for other characteristics,
however, we find this non-linear relationship.
It is possible that their own poverty constrains their ability  to save and invest, even
if good policies are in place.  If international capital markets were perfect, then private
money would flow to these reformers. But imperfections such as asymmetric information
could undermine this outcome.  Mali may be serious about reform, but if private investors
cannot accurately assess the situation then they may hold back.  Their reticence may
undermine an otherwise successful reform program.  In our model this is the feature that
generates the pattern in Figure 5: despite a high return to capital with good incentives in
place, extreme poverty retards saving and.  international capital markets are imperfect.  The
same pattern could as well be generated by a model in which there are increasing returns
to capital at very low income levels (and decreasing returns beyond some point).  For
example, the downward-sloping part of the "good policy" curve could reflect the fact that
developing countries with proper incentives can borrow technologies from more advanced
ones and that these possibilities diminish as countries approach the level of the advanced
ones.  The upward-sloping part of the curve may then reflect the fact that a threshold level
of human capital per person may be needed to take advantage of the opportunities to
borrow technologies.
7Whatever the underlying model, this figure suggests an obvious role for foreign aid
in spurring developing country growth.  Financial aid to poor countries that have put good
policies into place should have a high return.  It should help these countries move up the
steep part of the curve and achieve rapid growth.  Effective assistance necessarily should
be temporary.  At the same time, there is no reason to expect that providing finance into a
poor policy environment would accelerate the growth rate.  The poor policy countries
have weak incentives and a low return to capital.  Intuitively, one would not expect aid to
have a large impact in such an environment.
Whether or not aid has a greater effect on growth in a good incentive environment
is what we tested in our first paper.  The growth equation that emerges from our model
can be stated as follows:
Per capita GNP growth depends on
initial income
other initial conditions
index of the incentive regime
aid relative to GNP
aid/GNP interacted with the incentive regime
error term.
The main results from our earlier paper are presented in Table 1 (though here we are using
the broader measure of "good policy."). 6 The index of the incentive regime has a large
amount of explanatory power (the individual  elements could alternatively be used in lieu of
the index). Aid receipts by themselves have no significant  effect on growth in the OLS
8Table 1.  Paniel  Growth Regressions
Time dimension: six four-year periods.  1970-73 to 1990-93
Countries: 56 aid recipients
Dependent variable: Growth rate of per capita GDP
Regression No.  (1)  (2)  (3)
Observations  272  272  272
Method  OLS  OLS  2SLS
Constant  3.43  2.42  7.33
_  (0.76)  (0.53)  (I.1I1)
Initial GDP per capita  -0.49  -0.36  -1.02
(0.84)  (0.61)  (1.22)
Ethnic fractionalization  -.005  -.004  -.008
_______  __  (0.73)  (0.56)  (0.77)
Assassinations  -0.40  -0.38  -0.31
_________  (1.50)  (1.40)  (1.03)
Ethnic x assassin  .007  .006  .004
_________________  l__  (1.56)  (1.30)  (0.78)
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.02  0.03  0.03
(1.64)  (1.77)  (1.58
Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.40  -1.77  -1.86
(1.91)  (2.40)  (2.22)
East Asia  0.91  1.28  1.67
_______  __  (1.62)  (2.07)  (2.40)
Policy index  1.02  0.79  0.38
_  (7.01)  (4.32)  (I. 38).
Gov consumption  -7.30  -7.51  2.08
(1.57)  (1.65)  (1.38)_
Aid/GDP  0.11  0.16  -0.37
(0.86)  (1.18)  (0.82)_
Aid x Policy  0.26  0.80
_  ~~~~~  ~~(3.07) (2.37).
Aid2 x  Policy  -.03  -.08
.__  (3.66)  (1.74)
2 R2  _  .40  .41
Adj. R2  .36  .37 
Note: t-statistics  (in parentheses)  have been  calculated  with White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard
errors, for all regressions  in the paper.specification  (Regression  1). Our main  finding  is that aid interacted  with  the policy  index
has a strong  positive  association  with growth,  while aid squared  interacted  with the policy
index  has a negative  coefficient  (Regression  2).  There is an obvious  simultaneity  problem
in these OLS regressions:  aid may  be deliberately  allocated  to countries  in difficulty  due to
exogenous  shocks  (drought,  for example). We get around that by instrumenting  for aid
with  variables  that are correlated  with aid but that have  been shown  not to belong  in the
growth  regressions:  population  and measures  of donor interests,  such as membership  in
the franc  zone. In Regression  3 we instrument  for aid, aid interacted  with policy,  and aid
squared  interacted  with policy. The 2SLS regression  has the same qualitative  results  as
the OLS regression.
These results  indicate  that the effect  of aid on growth depends  on the quality  of the
incentive  regime  as well as on the volume  of aid received. Aid has a strong effect  on
growth in countries  with a good incentive  regime,  in a weak environment  the impact  is not
statistically  different  from zero. The negative  coefficient  on the quadratic  term means  that
there are diminishing  marginal  returns to aid: its impact  declines  as the volume  of aid
grows. To the extent  that the objective  of aid is to promote growth in developing
countries,  these results  imply  that aid should  be sharply  targeted to developing  countries
that have a sound  incentive  regime.
93. Aid and Infant Mortality
If aid is not supporting productive investments in countries with poor policies, then
it must be financing either unproductive investments or consumption.  Supporting
consumption in very poor countries is not necessarily a bad thing: the issue is, whose
consumption?  The central objective of development assistance is poverty reduction.  It
may be that aid is supporting the consumption of very poor households, which leads to
reductions in infant mortality and improvements in other social indicators.  These
developments may support growth in the very long term, in a way not picked up by
econometric studies.
There is quite a bit of evidence that the consumption that is being supported by aid
is government consumption.  Government consumption is a broad category that includes
recurrent spending on health and education (these might be considered investments, but
the accounting tradition is to record ther  as government consumption). It also includes
spending on social relief, defense, and adiministration. Thus, large government
consumption could reflect a big, corrupt lbureaucracy,  or it could reflect large expenditures
on social welfare that are helping to reduce poverty.  One cannot say a priori if it is good
or bad for development. 7
There are different estimates from different studies, but somewhere between one-
half and three-quarters of bilateral aid finances additional government consumption.
Furthermore, the empirical growth literature finds that government consumption has no
robust effect on growth.  Some studies find a negative effect, others a zero relationship.
The finding that aid largely finances government consumption, which in turn has no
10positive effect on growth, helps explain why aid is not fostering growth in many
developing countries.  It leaves open the question, however, of whether the consumption
might be helping the poor through social expenditures.
Ideally, we would want to look directly at the effect of aid on consumption of the
poor or on the incidence of poverty, but the number of countries for which such data are
available over time is small. The approach that we take here is to look directly at the
effect of aid on infant mortality, an important social indicator for which data are widely
available. Following earlier work, the model that we have in mind is:
Decline in infant mortality depends on
initial conditions




Given our findings about growth, however, we can substitute for it and have the following
reduced form equation:





aid/GNP interacted with incentive regimeerror term.
It has been well established that growth leads to reductions in infant mortality
(Pritchett and Summers, 1995), so it would be consistent with our earlier findings to see a
positive coefficient on the interactive term. 8 An important additional question is whether
government consumption and/or aid directly affects infant mortality, regardless of the
incentive regime. Once again we have to be concerned about the correlation of aid with
the error term (aid deliberately given to countries in distress) so that it is necessary to
instrument for aid and for aid interacted with the incentive regime.
In the OLS regression (#1 in Table 2) there is no significant  relationship between
aid and the decline in infant mortality.  Actually, the model only does moderately well in
explaining  the decline in infant mortality over the relatively short period of time, four
years.  There is a kind of "divergence" in that countries with high infant mortality to begin
with show smaller declines, ceteris paribus.  Countries with sound management have faster
declines in infant mortality, but the statistical significance  of the relationship is not strong.
There is no effect of government consumption on infant mortality.  Regression 2 is the
same, except that we instrument for aid with population and donor interest variables.
There are insignificant  positive coefficients on both aid and government consumption.
These results provide important information that supplements our earlier work.  There is
no evidence that the permanent component of aid -- which is what is extracted by the
instrumental variables technique -- has any affect on this important social indicator within
a four-year time period.  Thus, in a poor policy environment, neither growth nor decline in
infant mortality is supported by aid on average.
12Table 2. Panel Regressions for Decline in Infant Mortality
Time dimensions:  six four-year  periods. 1970-73  to 1990-93
Countries:  56 aid recipients
Dependent  variable:  Percent  decline  in infant mortality  (annual rate)
Regression No.  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)3
Observations  276  273  273  273
Method  OLS  2SLS  2SLS  2,SLS
Constant  7.5  7.8  6.3  6.5
(4.56)  (4.01)  (3.16)  (3.20)
Initial  infant mortality  -1.13  -1.2  -0.94  -1.01
(3.31)  (2.91)  (2.24)  (2.33)
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01
(1.72)  (1.53)  (I.L44  (1.09)
Assassinations  0.05  0.05  0.04  0.03
(0.77)  (0.74)  (0.45)  (0.32)
M2/GDP (lagged)  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02
(0.29)  (0.15)  (0.52)  (0.85)
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.58  -0.67  -1.39  -1.44
(1.46)  (1.66)  (2.95)  (3.08)
East Asia  -0.30  -0.32  0.15  0.04
(0.72)  (0.75)  (0.25)  (0.07)
Policy index  0.19  0.19  -0.10  -0.09
(1.37)  (1.35)  (0.32)  (0.29)
Gov consumption  1.96  1.62  4.53  3.08
(0.56)  (0.37)  (0.4  (0.51)
Aid/GDP  -0.03  0.02  0.04  0.11
(0.52)  (0.16)  (0.23)  (0.50)
Aid x Policy  0.53  0.75
2  (1.55)  (1.75)
Aid2 x Policy  --  -0.06  -0.12
____________  (1.57)  (1.82)
R  .21
Adjusted  R 2 .17
a The measure  of aid in regression  4 excludes  technical  assistance.
Note:  t-statistics  (in parentheses)  have been  calculated  with White's heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard
errors,  for all regressions  in the paper.As with growth, there is, however, a relationship between decline in infant
mortality and the interaction of aid and the incentive regime.  The interaction term has a
positive coefficient and the quadratic term a negative one (Regression 3).  The statistical
significance is weaker than in the growth regressions. It is interesting that the t-statistics
rise if technical assistance is taken out of the measure of aid (Regression 4).  This change
could reflect the fact that the impact of TA is not likely to seen in a social indicator within
a four-year time frame.  Alternatively, it could be that technical assistance has less impact
than capital assistance. Recall that the only impact at all here is in countries with sound
management.  It may be that financial assistance has a sharp impact in that case, but that
technical assistance is less needed.
According to these estimates, the impact of aid on the decline in infant mortality
depends on the quality of the incentive regime and on the volume of assistance. Based on
Regression 3, the derivative of the decline in infant mortality with respect to aid is
0.03 +0.53 x Management Index - 0.12 x Aid x Management.
The mean of aid is 1.7. (We measure aicl  relative to real PPP GDP, yielding smaller
figures than those that result from deflating aid by nominal GNP.)  Evaluating this
derivative at the mean of aid, we find that the estimated decline in infant mortality
resulting from an additional 1% of GDP in assistance is zero in a poor policy environment
(index = 0); 0.4 percent in an average environment (index = 1.1); and 0.9 percent in a
"good management" environment, defined as one standard deviation above the mean of
the index (that is, a value of 2.7) (Figure 6).  Referring to Figure 4, examples would be
13Figure 6. Decline in Infant Mortality from 1% of GDP in Aid
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Economic  Managementpoor policy, Zambia or Zaire (1986-89); average policy, India in the 1980s; and good
policy, Ghana (1986-89) or Indonesia (1982-85).
One potential criticism of this work is that low-income countries virtually by
definition have poor institutions and policies. Thus, it should be emphasized that the
econometric results indicate a sharp positive impact of aid for "relatively good policies"
that are well within the range of the historic experience of low-income countries.  India,
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Vietnam are all examples of low-income countries that have
reformed to become "good policy countries" in the 1  990s.  There remain significant
problems with their incentive regimes and none of these countries scores nearly as well as,
say, Botswana or Thailand on the management index. The point is that the movement
from very distorted regimes to relatively good regimes is necessary both for positive per
capita growth and for effective use of aid.
4. Conclusions
In developing countries with weak economic management -- evidenced by poor
property rights, high corruption, closed trade regimes, and macroconomic instability  --
there is no relationship between aid and.  the change in infant mortality. In these distorted
environments, development projects promoted by donors tend to fail [Isham and
Kaufmann (forthcoming); Isham, Kauftnann, and Pritchett (1997)].  Furthermore, aid
resources are typically fungible, so that these projects are not in fact what is financed by
aid [Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998)].  Aid is financing the whole public sector at the
margin, which is why the overall quality of management is key to effective assistance. A
14government that cannot put effective development policies into place is not likely to
oversee effective use of foreign aid.
On the other hand, there is a relationship between aid and the change in infant
mortality in cases in which a recipient has relatively good management.  In this situation an
additional 1% of GDP is aid has a powerful effect, reducing infant mortality by 0.9%.
These results are consistent with what we found for growth in our earlier work: aid spurs
growth only in a good policy environment.
These new findings strengthen the case for targeting foreign aid to countries that
have made improvements in economic policy. However, after controlling for per capita
income and population, there has been little relationship between the amount of aid that
countries get and their economic policies [Alesina and Dollar (1998)].  The relatively
indiscriminate allocation of assistance is one factor undermining the potential impact of
aid.
15Notes
Boone  (1994);  Killick  (1991);  Krueger,  Michalopoulos,  and Ruttan (1989);  Van De Walle  and Johnston
(1996).
2  Here  we are using the aid to real PPP GDP measures  developed  in Burnside  and Dollar (1997). For this
figure  we dropped  the observations  with aid less  than 1%  of GDP. These are mostly  middle-income
countries  such as Brazil,  Korea,  or Mexico. The statistical  relationship  between  aid and growth is the
same  whether  the middle-income  countries  are included  or not.
3  To create this picture  we took  the observations  with a policy  index above  2 (roughly  the top third of the
distribution)  and divided  them into a low-aid  half and a high-aid  half. This picture  summarizes  in a
simple  way what we showed  in our first paper to be a very  robust  relationship.
4 In this picture  we used the median  of the macroeconomic  policy  index and the median  of the ICRGE
measure  of institutional  quality  to create  four cells,  and averaged  growth  rates  for the observations  in each
cell. The picture  summarizes  relationships  that have  been established  in the literature  cited in this
paragraph.
5 The weights  in this index reflect  the relative  imlportance  of the different  factors  in a growth regression.
The constant  derives  from the non-policy  variables  in the regression  (initial conditions)  evaluated  at their
means. The mean of this index, 1.1,  is the same  as the mean  growth  rate of per capita GNP  for the
sample. A one unit increase  corresponds  to a policy  improvement  that should  result in an increase  in the
growth  rate of 1  percentage  point, other  things equal.
6 The measure  of aid comes  from Fernandez-Arias,  Serven,  and Chang (1998);  it combines  grants  with
the grant component  of concessional  loans. The statistical  results  are the same if we use the more
traditional  OECD measure  of aid, which  combines  grants with net disbursements  of concessional  loans
with  at least a 25% grant element.
7 Filmer and Pritchett, 1997,  find that there is little effect  of health expenditure  on infant  or child
mortality,  concluding  that the quality  of government  spending  is more  important  than quantity.
8 Some  insight into why growth  typically  leads  to improvement  in social  indicators  comes  from Bruno,
Ravallion,  and Squire  (1998). They show  that for the majority  of developing  countries  there is no time
trend  in the distribution  of income. Thus, increases  in per capita income  tend to benefit  all segments  of
the income  distribution  and lead to broad-based  gains in social  indicators. Similarly,  Ravallion  and Chen
(1997)  find that growth  and poverty  reduction  are highly  correlated  across  countries.
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